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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction 
Corwin brings before this Court a question of law, asking 
if criminal evidence that had a statute of limitations expired, 
and revived by unreasonable application of a legislative act, 
is action that is reprehensible and objectionable to the interest 
of finality in judgments of constitutional conclusions of guilty 
pleas, the substantive due process doctrine, statutory law, and 
the ex post facto clause. 
B. Statement Of The Facts and Course Of The Proceedings. 
On January 31, 1998, Corwin was issued a Uniform Citation 
for Driving Under the Influence of Alchole (DUI), Idaho Code 
section (I.C. §), 18-8004. Judgment was entered March 12, 1998. 
"R", pp. 71 & 73. In conjunction with the advice given about 
Corwin's statutory and constitutional rights, including the 
right to counsel, at sentencing the Court gave Corwin written 
notice of penalties for subsequent violations of the DUI statute, 
"R", p. 75. 
On November 17, 1998, a Washington Uniform Court Dockett 
was filed charging Corwin with DUI from intoxicating liquor or 
drugs. Corwin entered a guilty plea on January 26, 1999, in the 
Ritzville District Court, State of Washington. "R", p. 77 & 81. 
On October 24, 2007, Corwin was convicted by jury trial 
of a DUI violation, I.C. § 18-8004. One day later, the court 
found Corwin guilty of felony DUI, after accepting the above 
two convictions as criminal evidence. A direct appeal was filed, 
and upon its finalization, a petition for post-conviction was 
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filed on September 15, 2010. 
The Court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, and counsel 
on February 28, 2011, responded that Corwin was standing upon 
the previous pleadings in this matter as well as the applicable 
statutory and case law. "R", p. 103. 
Seven months later, on November 2, 2011, Corwin gave Notice 
to the Court that he was having a conflict with counsel's repre-
sentation. He asserted that counsel had failed to amend his 
first cause of action, and went on to clarify that counsel had 
not consulted with him on whether legal research or a brief 
would be filed. "R", pp. 112, 113 & 116. See also p. 124. 
The record reflects Corwin wanted to correct and amend 
the record, and to substitute counsel. A motion was filed on 
February 17, 2012, to suspend the proceedings and was never 
heard. "R", pp. 125-126. Corwin further submitted as cause, 
a letter counsel sent to him advicing him that he felt Judge 
Ryan was going to grant him an evidentiary hearing. Counsel 
felt he would be able to present evidence to support his petition, 
and get the judge to withdraw his guilty plea. "R", p. 1 41 • 
An evidentiary hearing was held on November 29, 2012. 
The court filed its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
and on January 2, 201 3, counsel filed a notice of appeal. As prelim-
ary issues, he presented two questions regarding the Court's 
abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw a guilty 
plea. "R", p. 174. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I 
Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreason-
able application of a legislative act, reprehensible 
and objectionable to the interest of finality in con-
stitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substan-
tive due process doctrine, and the ex post facto 
clause? 
II 
Should the district court have resolved a conflict 
of interest issue, and substituted counsel before 
addressing the claims on their merits? 
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I 
Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreasonable 
application of a legislative act, reprehensible and 
objectionable to the interest of finality in constitu-
tional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due 
process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause. 
C. Standards Of Review. 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the 
allegations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
I.C. § 19-4907; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992 
P.2d 144, 148-49 (1999). When reviewing a decision denying post-
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court 
will not disturb the lower court's findings unless they are clear-
ly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Id. at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. The 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are 
all matters solely within the province of the district court. 
Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct.App.1988). 
The Appeal's Court exercises free review of the district court's 
application of the relevant law to the facts. Roberts v. State, 
132 Idaho 494, 496, 495 P.2d 782, 784 (1999). 
D. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel. 
A defendant may raise issues of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-
conviction relief, but not both. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 
801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992). Corwin raises ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel only on the first issue. Corwin 
acknowledges that ineffective assistance claims usually cannot 
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be treated on direct review for want of an opportunity to develop 
and include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of the 
allegations. Cf. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 
789 (1989)(inadequately raised issues on post-conviction are 
permitted to be raised in a subsequent application.) In this 
case Corwin asserts the record is sufficient to permit a fair 
evaluation of the merits of his claim. 
E. The Argument 
Corwin asserts that criminal evidence that has a statute 
of limitations, which has expired, cannot be used in a subsequent 
prosecution of the DUI statute without offending the interest of 
finality in constitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the sub-
stantive due process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause. This 
affirmation is derived because the constitution does not permit 
infringement on finality of judgments, the substantive due process 
doctrine does not permit unreasonable application of a legislative 
act, and the ex post facto clause protects more than liberty. 
In 1998, I.e.§ 18-8005 defined, created, and regulated 
Corwin's conduct as a violator of the DUI statute. The statute's 
intent to deter Corwin from committing another DUI described that: 
if a defendant was found guilty of the DUI statute and had two 
prior convictions within five (5) years, that person would be 
guilty of a felony. I.e. § 18-8005, further mandated the court 
give notice of the penalties that would be imposed for subsequent 
violations. From this law Corwin's two 1998 DUI convictions 
became criminal evidence to a subsequent violation, if that 
violation occurred within five years. 
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From the above substantive law one can only presume the 
legislature intended an expiration date on what has been determined 
as the sentencing objective of deterrent. See State v. Nickerson, 
121 Idaho 925, 929, 828 P.2d 1330 (Ct.App.1992)(held that the 
legislature's ultimate objective to mandate the notice of I.e. § 
18-8005, was a means of accomplishing the sentencing objective of 
deterring future offenses.) Therefore, a subsequent violation 
within that time period, permitted admission of convictions as 
evidence to aggravate the penalties that may be imposed. 
In 1998, Corwin in two separate occasions was cited, and 
convicted of two DUis. He entered plea agreements in both cases, 
and pled guilty voluntarily with the foregoing understanding. 
Those convictions in 2003 became "null and void" as evidence in 
any subsequent violation. The state nonetheless under authority 
of the 2006 amended DUI statute (1) unreasonably applied time-barred 
criminal evidence, and (2) th~ statute itself was enacted after the 
pre-existing period had expired on that evidence. 
Post-conviction counsel abdicated this claim and did not 
present it to the court by brief or at the evidentiary hearing. 
The District Court was left with only the allegations made in 
the first cause of action of the petition. The Court's analysis 
of State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497 (Ct.App.2009), was 
employed in concluding that Corwin's substantive due process 
violation was without merit. The court viewed Corwin's claim 
as being the same as in Lamb. This was error. 
The precepts in Lamb were that a trial court's advisement 
of the risk of future penalties under a recidivist statute is 
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a warning designed to deter a defendant from committing future 
offenses, not a promise that puts restraints on future prosecu-
tions. (The Lamb Court citing, State v. Nickerson, 121 Idaho 
925, 928, 828 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Ct.App.1992)). That conclusion 
ensued from Lamb's assertion that the trial Court's warnings in 
his prior DUI convictions, somehow had become part of his plea 
agreement. This Court held his claim was frivolous. 
In contrast to Lamb and Nickerson Corwin brings before this 
Court two questions of law entwined to the same end. The first 
is: Is criminal evidence that had a statute of limitations expire 
and revived by unreasonable application of a legislative act, is 
that action reprehensible and objectionable to the interest of 
finality in judgments of constitutional conclusions of guilty 
pleas? The second is: Does the Federal and State Constitution's 
ex post facto clauses protect individuals from cruel and unusual 
punishments, by preventing governments from applying enacted 
statutes unreasonably, that are "manifestly unjust and oppressive" 
in its retroactive effect? 
The Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
reflected that Corwin was asserting "the revision of I.C. § 
18-8005(5) constituted a violation of the contracts clause and 
the state whould have been estopped by judgment and law from 
relitigating those two prior DUis." "R", p. 165. The Court 
therefore quoted State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497 
(Ct.App.2009), as rejecting the same claim raised by Corwin. 
This error committed by the Court was due to post-conviction 
counsel's abdication of this claim. 
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Corwin contended by petition that the validity of negotiated 
convictions and the integrity of their judgments could not be 
compromised. "R", p. 6. Entwined with this claim was that 
retrospective application of law which makes evidence that was 
made incompetent by substantive law, to then become competent 
alongside competent evidence was unreasonable classification 
of Corwin as a violator of felony law. "R", p. 5. It was post-
conviction counsel's duty to make that clear. Of how the essence 
of due process is to protect unreasonable action. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 6th Ed., 13th reprint-1998. 
Post-conviction counsel's abdication of this claim allowed 
the Court to derive its conclusions from assertions made in the 
petition. The adjudicative facts perceived by the Court are 
therefore lacking in clarity and logic as to why Corwin is legally 
innocent of a felony. 
F. The Finality Of Judgments And Guilty Pleas. 
The law at issue here created an extended ten years "look 
back" period extending the time in which the State would be allowed 
to inquire into the admissibility of criminal evidence to aggra-
vate the prosecution of a DUI. I.C. § 18-8005(6) states that 
anyone who is found guilty of violating I.C. § 18-8004, and has 
had two prior convictions of that code within ten years shall 
be guilty of a felony. This law was unreasonably used to permit 
evidence that was "null and void" to be admitted, which the 
passage of time had previosly barred. Do this features of the 
law taken together produce the kind of retroactivity that State 
law and the Constitutions and U.S. Supreme Court decisions forbid? 
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Corwin concludes that they do. 
The admission of criminal evidence is prohibited by the 
interest in finality of judgments when a guilty plea is at issue. 
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)([W]hen a 
guilty plea is at issue, "the concern with finality served by 
limitation on collateral attack has special force.") This Court 
just as many others have held that a defendant has no right 
under the Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of 
prior misdemeanor DUis. See State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 92, 
90 P.3d 314 (2004). Similarly, the state has not acquired by 
statutory law a right to permeate the understanding and validity 
of voluntary guilty pleas. These are accrued rights under the 
the due process clause. I.C. § 73-106 directs as follows: 
"No action or proceeding commenced before the compiled 
laws take effect, and no right accrued, is effected by 
their provisions, but the proceeding therein must con-
form to the requirements of the compiled laws as far as 
applicable." 
In this case finality of judgements of constitutional conclusions 
were at rest, final. 
The retroactive application of the amended law bestowed the 
state with an acute form of penetrating finality of judgments. 
It is undisputed that Corwin has performed as mandated by law 
and plea agreements, and complied with the terms of his original 
judgment. The state received the benefits of its bargain and 
the legislature received its five years deterrence of its sentencing 
objective. It would therefore be unjust to allow one party to 
permeate the understanding a court and Corwin had when they finalized 
the constitutional conclusions involved. 
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A plea that is entered with a full understanding of what 
the plea connotes and its consequences is a valid plea. E.g., 
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999). Corwin 
thus asserts the integrity of contractual judgments cannot be 
compromised by a change in the law. 
The United States Supreme Court in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 
20, 113 s.ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), noted that principles 
of finality associated with habeas corpus actions applied with 
at least equal force, if a defendant sought to attack a previous 
conviction used for sentencing. Similarly, the extension of 
an expired statute of limitations, by retroactive application of 
a legislative act the state has manipulated a district court to 
deprive another court's judgment of its normal force and effect, 
in a proceeding that had an independent purpose, as it considered 
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. Just as a defen-
dant has no right to collaterally challenge the validity of 
contractual findings of guilt, because they are final, the state 
should also be prohibited in permeating the finality of judgments 
to constitutional conclusions by retroactive application of 
law, as in this case. 
"Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confi-
dence in the integrity of our procedures." United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, n.11 (1979). That was dicta by 
the high court in unfolding the interest of promoting the finality 
of judgments. 
I.e. § 73-106, directs that no right accrued is affected 
by new law, and proceedings must conform to the requirements 
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of compiled laws. How many times can a statute of limitations 
expire, and how many times can legislature revive dead evidence 
in the so called orderly administration of justice by the judi-
ciary? You can have life extended, but you can't bring back 
the dead over and over. The United States Supreme Court and 
the Idaho courts have accepted the interest that finality has 
served on limitations of defendants attacking collaterally guilty 
pleas. Why not then when retroactive application of new laws 
permeate guilty pleas? 
The foregoing principle bears weight on the issue at hand 
and the interest of finality. The conclusion Corwin urges is 
mandated by stare decisis, the substantive due process doctrine, 
and Idaho code. 
G. The Ex Post Facto Connection. 
Inadmissible evidence that is used to enhance a conviction 
should fall within the categorical descriptions of the ex post 
facto laws Justice Chase set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 (1978); because 
no quantum of reasoning can revive evidence with a statutory 
limit once it has expired. Corwin is arguing the inadmissibility 
of evidence at a criminal proceeding. 
I.e. § 18-8005 is not ex post facto; but its retroactive 
application in this case, where evidence is "null and void", 
is ex post facto. The Idaho courts and numerous other state 
courts have fallen on the precept that the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently and routinely held that statutes that 
increase penalties for recidivism do not violate the ex post facto 
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clause. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26, 27, 113 s.ct. 517, 
521, 522, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 401, 402 (1992). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has done the same. Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 963 
P.2d 1159 (1998). 
Corwin asserts that recidivist statutes do not violate a 
defendant's rights, because a defendant doesn't have any rights 
that have been granted. With exception, recidivist statutes 
are enhancing penalties for crimes that permit an inquiry into 
evidence which does not have an expiration date. Corwin thus 
claims that where a statute of limitation exist on criminal 
evidence, that element has to be considered in the inquiry. 
The legislature is presumed to have intended an expiration 
of its deterrent purpose, otherwise why would they have placed 
an amnesty on such criminal evidence. This statute is substantive 
law and not procedural law. Litigants have rights in substantive 
law. 
Instructive in this claim is State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 
539, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985), in its analysis the court 
incorporated the following statement of the distinction between 
substantive law and procedural law: 
"Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct 
and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates 
defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, 
practice and procedure pertain to the essentially 
mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive 
law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." (quoted by 
the court from State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 
674, 677 (1974)(en bane). 
State v. Beam, 121, Idaho 862, 863, 864, 826 P.2d 891, 892, 893 
(1992); see also Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 96, 574 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (Ariz.App.Div.1977). 
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In this case the DUI statute prescribes norms for societal 
conduct and punishment by its deterrent purpose. It does not 
seek to regulate the mechanical operations of the courts by 
which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated. It 
further prescribes a limit of time on criminal evidence that 
may be introduced. 
Corwin contends that retroactive application of the amended 
DUI statute, took away and impaired rights acquired under the 
1998 DUI statute and created a new obligation. See I.e.§ 73-
106, and Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 40 (D.Idaho 1955) 
(The court defined "a retroactive law, in the legal sense, is 
one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under 
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches 
a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations 
already past." Id. at 42.) 
The United States Supreme Court in arguments about ex post 
facto laws reasoned that, after a certain time, no quantum of 
evidence is sufficient to convict. See United States v. Marion, 
404 U.S. 307, 322 ( 1971). In this sense, a new law would "violate" 
previous evidence-related legal rules by authorizing the courts 
to receive evidence which the Courts of Justice would not pre-
viously have admitted as sufficient proof of a crime. Cf. Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990)("subtle ex post facto 
violations are no more permissible than overt ones."); Cummings 
v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 227, 329 (1867)(The ex post facto clause 
cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is 
exerted.") 
- 13 -
Judgments typically rest in large part upon evidentiary 
concerns. For example, the passage of time that has eroded 
memories, made witnesses or other evidence unavailable. United 
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); 4 W. LaFave, J. 
Israel, and N. King, Criminal Procedure§ 18.5(a), p. 718 (1999); 
Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice§ 316, at 210. The high 
court once described statutes of limitations as creating "a 
presumption which renders proof unnecessary." Wood v. Carpenter, 
101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). 
Similarly in this case, to resurrect evidence after the 
relevant statute of limitations has expired is to eliminate a 
currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding admissibility, 
and thereby to permit aggravation of a crime on a quantum of 
evidence where that quantum, at the time the new law was enacted, 
would have been legally inadmissible. In that sense, the new 
law "violates" previous evidence related legal rules by authoriz-
ing the court to receive evidence which a court of justice would 
not previously have admitted as sufficient proof for aggravating 
a conviction. 
Corwin asserts that the ex post facto clause, the substantive 
due process doctrine protected him from cruel and unusual punish-
ments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, by preventing govern-
ments from applying enacted statutes with manifestly unjust and 
oppressive retroactive effects. 
Alternatively, extension of statutes of limitations before 
their expiration dates are not violative of ex post facto law. 
Cf. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 514 (1880)("[I]n any case 
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where a right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by 
the completion of the period of limitation, that period is subject 
to enlargement or repeal without being obnoxious to the constitu-
tional prohibition against ex post facto laws.") 
Similarly, if criminal evidence has a statute of limitations 
that has not expired, they can be lawfully extended. Alternatively, 
if criminal evidence has an expired limitation, the retroactive 
application, as in this case, by the use of the increased "look 
back" period is a form of ex post facto law. As was said in 
Cummings v. Missouri, supra, the ex post facto clause cannot be 
evaded by the form in which the power of the state is exerted. 
Therefore, the substantive due process doctrine and the ex post 
facto clause prohibit unreasonable application of law to aggravate 
penalties. 
The United States Constitution's two ex post facto clauses, 
Art. I, § 9, cl.3, Art. I,§ 10, cl.1, the Idaho Constitution's 
ex post facto clause, Art. I, § 16, the substantive due process 
doctrine, I.e. §§ 73-101, 73-106, and the finality of judgment 
doctrine of guilty pleas prohibit retroactive application of the 
2006 amendm?nt to the DUI statute in this case. 
II 
Should the district court have resolved a conflict 
of interest issue, and substituted counsel before 
claims on their merits. 
H. The Abuse of Discretion Argument. 
Idaho Courts have held that a post-conviction court that 
is presented with a request for appointed counsel must address 
that request before ruling on the substantive issue in the case. 
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I.C. § 19-4904 annotation, Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 214 P.3d 
668 (2009), reviewed denied. Where counsel has been 
appointed, a district court appoints counsel in order to give the 
applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege 
the necessary supporting facts. I.C. § 19-4904 annotation, 
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,254 P.3d 69 (2011), review 
denied. 
More, I.e.§ 19-4908 permits successive petitions for post-
conviction relief, if for "sufficient reason" an issue was inade-
quately raised. Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
has been held to be sufficient reason. Hernandez v. Idaho, 133 
Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct.App.1999)(An allegation of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides 
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations to be 
raised in a subsequent post-conviction application.)(citing, 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981 ). 
Corwin avers that post-conviction counsel denied him effec-
tive assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest he had 
in his representation, but kept silent. Corwin reserves this 
claim for successive collateral review, if it becomes necessary. 
He raise ineffective assistance facts as part of the question 
leading to the court's discretion to appoint substitute counsel. 
Corwin contends the judiciary had a duty to resolve the conflict 
that existed, in order to not delay and impair the orderly admin-
istration of justice. Now this Court of Appeals is involved, 
and will a successive petition have to follow? 
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Corwin asserts that the initial-review collateral proceeding 
in this case was the first designated proceeding for Corwin to 
raise a claim of ineffective assisance of trial counsel, and as 
such this post-conviction proceeding is equivalent of prisoner's 
direct appeal, as to the denial of a constitutional right. An 
attorney on a direct appeal with a conflict of interest knows 
he has duty to give notice by motion to the court, before the 
claims are resolved on their merits. Otherwise a prisoner may 
be denied a fair process and the opportunity to comply with 
state procedures. 
Corwin contends that the underlying ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claim is a substantial one and had merit. Post-
conviction counsel failed to file a notice akin to an Anders 
brief with the court. In effect conceding that he could not 
represent Corwin in his petition for post-conviction. The record 
reflects Corwins complaints and desire to substitute counsel. 
Did the court abused its discretion in ignoring the conflict 
and to take adequate steps to ascertain whether there was a risk 
of an actual conflict of interest to warrant substituting counsel. 
The record identifies that a plausible defense was foreclosed 
because of this conflict. The District Court acknowledge that 
Corwin's assertion of trial counsel's failure to contact him, and 
investigate his case, taken as true, suggests that counsel may 
have been deficient for failing to diligently pursue his case. 
"R", p. 169. Now the system is beginning to clog up a valid and 
meritorious claim of neglect by a trial counsel, that reaches 
complete denial of counsel. See "R", p. 6. 
- 17 -
Trial counsel had a duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investiga-
tion unnecessary. In an ineffectiveness case, a particular 
decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reason-
ableness under all the circumstances. See Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003)(citing, Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984). 
Trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing testified that 
when his client and himself do not see eye to eye on the theory 
of the defense, he will switch the client with somebody else. 
Tr., p. 92, Ls. 16-19. Counsel further asserted that since the 
theory of was that Corwin was not the driver, he had to assume 
Corwin told him he was not driving. Tr., p. 96, ls. 10-17. 
Corwin was claiming counsel never had any communication 
with him to make a decision on how to defend him. He testified 
at the hearing that on October 15, one week before trial, and 
in open court, counsel admitted he had not talked to any witnesses 
or to Corwin. Tr., p. 18, ls 4-5. Corwin further stated counsel 
came to the jail to visit him only once, and that was the night 
before the trial. Tr., pp 17 and 18. Corwin's wife was one 
of those witnesses, and the trial transcripts reveal Corwin 
was the driver. 
This case was tried on a lie, which was recorded on a police 
report. Furthermore, counsel revealed that of about 89 cases he 
defended by jury trial, a substantial number of those cases were 
tried with post-conviction. Tr., p. 88, ls. 19-22. More, post-
conviction counsel failed to discover the county jail logbook 
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on attorney visits, or Corwin's criminal file of the criminal 
diary. He also failed to submit the transcripts of the trial. 
Post-conviction counsel was having to accuse a friend, 
ex-associate and now judge. He therefore ignored Corwin's pleas 
and his case. Examples of his neglect are found in a letter 
and the notice of appeal he filed. "R", pp. 141 and 174. Counsel 
was defending a non-existing motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Post-conviction counsel like trial counsel neglected and ignored 
his client. Was it counsel's obligation as an officer of the 
court to bring this conflict to the court, or was it the court's 
duty to inquire into Corwins Notice of Conflict and his motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Corwin therefore prays this court reaches the conclusions 
urged herein and vacates the felony conviction; or in the alter-
native remand this case for the court to substitute counsel, 
and give new counsel time to prepare for an evidentiary hearing. 
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